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Abstract 
In recent years, the formerly oligopolistic Enterprise Application Software (EAS) industry began to dis-
integrate into focal inter-firm networks with one huge, powerful, and multi-national platform vendor as 
the center, surrounded by hundreds or even thousands of small, niche players that act as complementors. 
From a theoretical point of view, these platform ecosystems may be governed by two organizing princi-
ples - trust and power. However, it is neither from a practical nor from a theoretical perspective clear, 
how trust and power relate to each other, i.e. whether they act as complements or substitutes. This study 
tries to elaborate our understanding of the relationship of trust and power by exploring their interplay 
using multi-dimensional conceptualizations of trust and power, and by investigating potential dynamics 
in this interplay over the course of a partnership. Based on an exploratory multiple-case study of seven 
dyadic partnerships between four platform vendors, and seven complementors, we find six different 
patterns of how trust and power interact over time. These patterns bear important implications for the 
successful management of partnerships between platform vendors and complementors, and clarify the 
theoretical debate surrounding the relationship of trust and power.  
Keywords: Power, Trust, Platform Ecosystems, Interplay 
1 Introduction 
In the development of software, inter-organizational networks have continuously gained in importance. 
Today, users of Android-powered smartphones, tablet computers, or notebooks, for instance, can access 
almost 900,000 applications, provided by third-party developers on Google Play, Google’s application 
store. But in spite of this vast number of applications, the market’s actual growth rate is even more 
impressive. Established in fall 2008, Google Play already offered 200’000 applications as of early 2011, 
and has continued to increase its growth rate until today (AppBrain, 2013, De Vere, 2012). This repre-
sentative example arrestingly illustrates the increasing importance of the international division of labor 
across the limits of one single organization in the field of information and communication technology 
(ICT) (Gawer, 2009). Yet, this trend towards inter-organizational networks, has not just altered the 
smartphone, but also the enterprise application software (EAS) industry (Messerschmitt and Szyperski, 
2003, Sarker et al., 2012, Tiwana et al., 2010). In other words, today dominant system vendors, often 
referred to as hubs or platform vendors (Jarillo, 1988, Messerschmitt and Szyperski, 2003) moved from 
being integrated-systems suppliers to being providers of underlying platforms. These platforms, together 
with their interfaces, build the foundation for complementary applications provided by a plethora of 
smaller software companies, often referred to as spokes or complementors (Tiwana et al., 2010). To-
gether, a platform and its complementors form a loosely-coupled (Orton and Weick, 1990), inter-firm 
network called a platform ecosystem (Jansen et al., 2013), illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Elements of platform ecosystems in the EAS industry based on Tiwana et al. (2010) 
In contrast to other types of inter-organizational cooperation, collaboration in these platform ecosystems 
is based on neither capital nor joint effort in a specific project or business area. Instead, collaboration is 
based on general agreements and certifications of the complementors’ products, resources, or capabili-
ties (Huber et al., 2010, Kude et al., 2012, Vitharana, 2003). What is more: Platform ecosystems differ 
from traditional inter-organizational cooperation (networks) through substantial resource asymmetries 
and unilateral dependence (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012, Huber et al., 2010, Kude et al., 2012, Sarker et al., 
2012, Vitharana, 2003).  Hence, compared with complementors, platform vendors are large multina-
tional software providers that possess superior material, technological, economic and informational re-
sources (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012, Huang et al., 2013). In other words, while complementors as collabo-
rators unilaterally depend on these superior resources, platform vendors rather aim at creating positive 
network effects for their platform by motivating as many small niche players as possible to become 
complementors (Gao and Iyer, 2006, Kude et al., 2012, Sarker et al., 2012). Platform vendors therefore 
depend on their network of complementors, while complementors depend on the resources provided by 
the respective platform vendor.  
This twofold asymmetry of resources and inter-dependence creates uncertainty which, from a theoretical 
point of view, can be overcome through two organizing principles: On the one hand, the unilaterally 
dependent complementor could make a “leap of faith” (Möllering, 2006, p. 106) by accepting its vul-
nerability, i.e., the complementor may trust the platform vendor to not take advantages of its vulnera-
bility (Mayer et al., 1995, Rousseau et al., 1998), and on the other hand, a platform vendor could utilize 
its superior attributes to force the complementor to act according to the platform vendor’s will, i.e., the 
platform vendor could exert power (Bachmann, 2001). 
While prior research on inter-organizational collaboration almost exclusively investigated the role of 
trust, the role of power within the context of platform ecosystems has rarely been investigated (cf. 
Bachmann, 2001, Hart and Saunders, 1997, Hart and Saunders, 1998, Jasperson et al., 2002). Moreover, 
given the unique twofold asymmetry mentioned above, both trust and power may be of major importance 
in the context of platform ecosystems and therefore investigating both could deepen our understanding 
of how this novel type of inter-organizational collaboration may be effectively managed. In addition, 
such a study of both trust and power might be not only topically but also theoretically appealing because 
trust and power are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, there is a wider theoretical debate as to 
whether they act as complements or as substitutes (cf. Alvarez et al., 2003, Bachmann, 2001, Ireland 
and Webb, 2007, Lane and Bachmann, 1997, Molm, 1997). This prompted this study, which attempts 
to explore the following research question by analyzing seven dyadic partnerships between four different 
platform vendors and their respective complementors: 
How do trust and power collude before and in relationships between complementors and platform ven-
dors in the enterprise application software industry (EAS)?  
This paper is organized as follows. First, we lay the theoretical foundations of this study by introducing 
the concepts of trust and power. Next, we show the controversy surrounding the relationship of trust and 
power. We then argue, following recent advances in both general management and IS literature (Huber 
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et al., 2013, Lewis, 2000), that this controversy could be clarified using multi-dimensional conceptuali-
zations and by considering the role of time. Subsequently, the study’s research design is described. The 
study’s results are then presented and discussed.  
2 Theoretical Foundation 
2.1 Trust 
In recent years the concept of trust heavily gained in importance as a fundamental explanation for busi-
ness behavior in inter-organizational contexts (Janowicz and Noorderhaven, 2006). Trust is commonly 
regarded as the willingness to be vulnerable,  based on the assessment of another’s party’s benevolence, 
competence and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995, Rousseau et al., 1998). Thus, instead safeguarding against 
risks, one party, the so called trustor, can make a “leap of faith” (Möllering, 2006, p. 106) by having 
confidence in another party, the so called trustee, to not take advantages of its vulnerability. While it is 
widely accepted that only individuals can place trust, this trust may be placed in a huge variety of objects 
(Janowicz and Noorderhaven, 2006). In platform ecosystems of the enterprise software industry bound-
ary spanners act as single points of entry (Kude et al., 2012, Sarker et al., 2012). Therefore, we follow 
Janowicz and Noorderhaven (2006) who have proposed a trust conceptualization that acknowledges this 
paramount importance of boundary spanners  Hence, in the context of platform ecosystems, two objects 
of trust are of paramount importance: If the object of trust is an individual, we may speak of inter-
personal trust. If the object of trust is another organization, we may speak of inter-organizational trust. 
For instance, an employee of a complementor’s organization may place his or her trust into the platform 
vendor’s boundary spanner, responsible for managing the partnership with the respective complement-
ors (Inter-personal trust). Alternatively, the same employee may also develop trust towards the platform 
vendor itself as a collective actor (Inter-organizational trust) (see Table 1). 
 
 Who is trusted? (Trustee) 
  Individual Organization 
Who trusts? 
(Trustor) 
Individual 
Individual → Individual 
Inter-personal trust 
Individual → Organization 
Inter-organizational Trust 
Table 1: Conceptualizations of inter-organizational trust adapted from Janowicz and Noorder-
haven (2006)  
2.2 Power 
According to Emerson (1962), power of actor A over actor B is  the inverse of the dependence of actor 
B on actor A (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). In line with this general definition, French Jr. and Raven 
(1959) proposed a more fine-grained distinction between five sources of power, whereas each type de-
rives from a different dependency. Consequently they argue that a company’s dependency on another 
may be based on the other’s degree of control over rewards, punishment, and coercion, as well as one’s 
ability to impart and deploy legitimacy, attractiveness, and expertise (Forsyth, 2010). Reward and coer-
cion are referred to as sources of direct power, whereas reference, expertise and legitimacy are referred 
to as indirect power. Table 3 gives an overview of the types of power along with an example code for 
each type. 
 
Direct Power: 
 Definition: Example Codes: 
Reward 
Power: 
The ability of one economic actor to con-
trol both personal and impersonal rewards 
(punishments) provided to the respective 
opposite (Forsyth, 2010). 
- Hub defines criteria for access to / withdrawing 
of resources (knowledge, labor, or support). 
- Hub rewards spoke with material or immaterial 
benefits. 
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Coercive 
Power: 
The ability of an economic actor to coerce 
the respective opposite who does not suf-
ficiently comply with requests or de-
mands (Forsyth, 2010). 
- Hub defines mandatory requirements for an 
ecosystem participation. 
- Hub coerces spoke to comply with mandatory 
regulations for a further partner level ascent. 
 
Indirect Power: 
 Definition: Example Codes: 
Referent 
Power: 
The ability of an economic actor to influ-
ence the opposite parties based on their 
identification with, attraction to, or he re-
spect for that economic actor (Forsyth, 
2010). 
- Based on a hub’s market power (desirable ref-
erence) Spokes accept hub’s interventions. 
- The by the spokes considered platform attrac-
tiveness on the market enables a hub to proac-
tively intervene. 
Expert 
Power: 
The ability to influence an economic ac-
tor, based on the assumption that the op-
posite possesses superior skills, abilities, 
and/or information (Forsyth, 2010). 
- The dependence of a spoke on the perceived / 
assumed competence, knowledge, or innova-
tiveness of a hub, enables the hub to proactively 
influence the partnership. 
Legitimate 
Power: 
The socially sanctioned claim to a posi-
tion or role that gives the occupant the 
ability to require and demand compliance 
with claimed directives (Forsyth, 2010).  
- The perceived legitimacy allows the hub to act 
in a certain, otherwise inacceptable, manner. 
- Spoke considers hub to obtain superior attrib-
utes enabling the hub to proactively influence 
the partnership 
Table 2: Direct and indirect sources of power 
2.3 Exploring the Interplay of Power and Trust 
In research there is a controversy about how trust and power are related to each other. In this context 
two opposing theoretical views have arisen. On the one hand, trust and power are considered as substi-
tutes such that the exercise of power undermines trust and the existence of trust supersedes power. On 
the other hand, trust and power can be regarded as complements, i.e., exercising power can reduce un-
certainty and therefore facilitates a leap of faith, while the existence of trust may ease the exertion of 
power (Bachmann, 2001). Besides these contradictory theoretical accounts, hardly any study, especially 
in the IS context, has given empirical insight into the relationship of trust and power in inter-organiza-
tional relationships; and none of them has studied this important issue in the context of platform eco-
systems. In addition, the few empirical studies that have investigated the relationship of trust and power 
in inter-firm networks provide mixed empirical evidence (Hart and Saunders, 1997, Lane and 
Bachmann, 1997, Molm, 1997): While some studies rather support the substitutional view (Bachmann, 
2001), others rather support the complementary view (Alvarez et al., 2003, Ireland and Webb, 2007). 
In such situations of mixed empirical evidence for seemingly contradictory views, Lewis (2000) sug-
gests to apply two strategies to elaborate empirical studies and as a consequence to clarify theoretical 
debates. First, researchers are advised to apply more fine-grained conceptualizations of key concepts 
(Lewis, 2000). We follow this advice by studying the interplay of the above mentioned five sources of 
power (reward, coercive, referent, expert, legitimate) with the two types of trust (inter-personal, inter-
organizational). This procedure may enables a clarification of the debate of whether trust and power act 
as complements or as substitutes. For instance, while expert power and inter-personal trust may act as 
complements to each other, coercive power potentially undermines inter-organizational trust, and there-
fore acts as a substitute to trust. Second, Lewis (2000), suggests to consider the role of time. We follow 
this advice by studying the interplay of trust and power over the course of individual partnerships be-
tween platform vendors and complementors. This procedure may facilitates a clarification of the rela-
tionship between trust and power as they might act as complements at one point in time, whereas at a 
later point in time they may substitute each other (Huber et al., 2013). At the beginning of a partnership, 
for instance, the platform vendor might exert coercion by forcing the complementor to accept a stand-
ardized contract (i.e. it is the same contract for all complementors) that clearly defines the rules of the 
partnership. This may reduce uncertainty for the complementor, and eventually facilitates its decision 
to invest in trust (Bachmann, 2001). At a later point in time, however, the platform vendor possibly 
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detects that the complementor has violated the contract and subsequently exerts its contractually stipu-
lated right to punish the complementor, which then reduces the complementor’s trust towards the plat-
form vendor. Thus, power may act as a complement at one point in time and as a substitute later on. 
In sum, there is a lack of knowledge of how trust and power relate to each other. Consequently, we aim 
to provide theoretical and empirical elaboration of their complementary or substitutional relationship by 
studying the interplay of different types of trust and different types of power at different points in time.  
3 Methodological Approach 
3.1 Case Selection 
To gather more compelling data, and simultaneously to obtain more robust results, we applied a multi-
ple-case study design with seven dyadic partnerships in four globally leading EAS platform ecosystems 
(Yin, 2009). The selection of the four major multi-national EAS platform vendors, each maintaining a 
partner network of several thousand complementors all over the world, assured that the twofold asym-
metry mentioned above was in fact of major importance in the partnerships. Each case then analyzes 
one particular, dyadic partnership between a platform vendor and a specific complementor, thus, the 
unit of analysis of this study is the partnership between complementors and platform vendors. To keep 
other factors, which were not of direct theoretical interest, stable, all investigated partnerships of our 
study are located in one country - Switzerland. Based on these selection criteria, interviewees and case 
companies were chosen through snowball sampling (Diekmann, 2009), i.e., higher-level managers from 
the platform vendors were asked to identify suitable complementor companies.  
3.2 Data Collection 
For each case we interviewed at least two key experts in hourly interviews on site, via Skype or tele-
phone – for the platform vendor we interviewed the partner manager, and for the complementor we 
interviewed the employee responsible for managing the partnership with the respective platform vendor. 
Thus, for each partnership those individuals were interviewed who actually manage it. This interview 
data per case was supplemented with further information from line managers and technology profes-
sionals. In sum, this resulted in seventeen semi-structured interviews as delineated in Table 3. 
 
  No. Interviews held 
Spoke Hub 
 
Platform Vendor A 
HUBA 
BUSINESS provides specific CRM, Case Management, 
and Anything Relationship Management solutions for 
HUBA’s platform 
1 1 
1 
LAYOUT is a Swiss provider of an Enterprise Document 
Creation tool that complements the office platform of 
HUBA. 
1 1 
 
Platform Vendor B 
HUBB 
ENERGY complements various platforms of HUBB with 
a solution for trading and accounting energy, as well as 
for the management of international energy flows. 
1 1 
- 
INDIVIDUAL, as an erstwhile subsidiary of HUBB, pro-
vides nowadays heavily individualized solutions for 
HUBB’s platforms. 
1 1 
 
Platform Vendor C 
HUBC 
BANKING complements HUBC’s platform with a solution 
that extracts, transforms, analyses, and presents financial 
data of small and medium sized banks. 
1 1 1 
 
Platform Vendor D 
HUBD 
COUNTER provides a standard solution for HUBD’s plat-
form that supports retailers in selling goods and services 
by handling the transaction recording and billing. 
1 1 2 
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Table 3:  Platform Ecosystem 
In addition to the interviews, and for triangulation reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 2009), we also ana-
lyzed relevant documents for each partnership, as for instance partnership contracts, codes of conduct, 
partnership charters, company websites, or annual reports. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Based on the two sources of data, this paper follows Pettigrew’s (1990) and Pentland’s (1999) sugges-
tions for an iterative process of data analysis and theory building (Miles et al., 2013). First, documents 
and interview transcripts were coded according to the constructs of our initial theoretical considerations, 
i.e. they were coded according to whether they express trust (inter-organizational, and inter-personal) or 
power (coercive, reward, expert, referent, and legitimate). Then, data was ordered by time and sequence 
such that the flow of events of each case was reconstructed. This flow of events was summarized in first 
case-write-ups. Then, data was systematically scanned for evidence on how trust and power interacted 
in each case. Subsequently, we systematically compared the interactions across all cases for similarities 
and differences. This phase of constantly comparing and integrating findings (Faems et al., 2008) al-
lowed us to arrive at seven higher-level patterns – each of them describing a distinct interplay between 
different types of trust and different types of power. These patterns are presented in the next section.  
4 Findings 
In this section we present the findings of our exploratory multiple-case study. The structure of this sec-
tion follows our initial theoretical considerations, i.e., we present findings on the interplay of trust and 
power. First, we show five patterns of how different types direct power (coercive, reward) interact with 
different types of trust (inter-organizational, inter-personal). Then, we present a pattern of how different 
types of indirect power (referent, expert, legitimate) interact with inter-organizational trust.  
4.1 Direct Power and Trust 
Pattern 1: Inter-organizational trust as necessary pre-condition for coercive and reward power 
Our results show that over the course of a partnership between platform vendor and complementor dif-
ferent types of trust and different types of power interact in manifold ways. Yet, our results also point 
to the fact that different types of interactions systematically develop at different points in time.  
An initial interaction usually takes place the moment partnership between platform vendor and comple-
mentor starts. Then, a complementor is faced with the decision of whether to accept or refuse the con-
tractually given permission to apply coercive and reward power by a platform vendor. In other words, a 
platform vendor stipulates for example its right to force complementors to behave in a distinct manner 
in order to be eligible for desired benefits. Platform vendors usually manifest this ability in a standard-
ized way, as it was confirmed in every ecosystem: 
In the scope of the partner network, partners have to sign standardized agreements. (HUBA-BS2) 
Those standardized agreements are utterly important since, in the end, it matters money and 
legal consequences. (HUBB-BS1) 
In general, every partner signs the standardized partner agreement. (HUBC-BS1) 
An important contract, every partner has to sign, surely is the partner agreement. (HUBD-BS1) 
With those standardized agreements the platform vendors define the rules of the partnership in terms of 
what actions are considered as correct behavior. Interestingly, the platform vendor also stipulates the 
AFFILIATE complements HUBD’s platform with ERP so-
lutions, specially tailored for subsidiaries of smaller and 
medium sized companies. 
1 
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right to reward complementors in cases of correct behavior, and to punish complementors when they act 
inappropriate. In other words, a complementor that is willing to partner, is forced to decide whether to 
accept these standardized rules or not: 
[HUBB] would never accept to partner with a complementor without the complementor having 
signed agreements beforehand. (INDIVIDUALBS) 
Interestingly, the complementors’ decision of whether to enter or not a partnership with a platform ven-
dor, and therefore the decision of whether to accept the “stick” of a standardized contract and potential 
punishments and the “carrot” of future rewards, hinges on the trust the complementor places in the 
platform vendor. For instance, ENERGY’s “most important reason” (ENGERGYBS) to join an ecosys-
tem was that they trusted HUBB’s technology and that they were confident about HUBB’s integrity: “we 
were well aware of what [HUBB] could and what we have to expect”. Likewise, BUSINESSBS has 
enough confidence in HUBA to not behave opportunistically and accepts the given rules:  
[HUBA] could not afford any mistake, since the entire world is monitoring them. (BUSINESSBS) 
And BANKINGBS moreover insinuated that he believes that HUBC is trustworthy due to his integrity 
[HUBC] not only speaks well about themselves but also acts accordingly. (BANKINGBS) 
Thus, inter-organizational trust is a necessary pre-condition for the acceptance of giving the platform 
vendor the right to exert coercive and reward power. 
Pattern 2: The strength of the negative relationship between the execution of coercive power and 
inter-organizational trust is moderated by the perceived legitimacy of power execution 
Once a complementor has entered a platform ecosystem each platform vendor is in principle entitled to 
exert coercive power. Our cases indicate that the effect of the exertion of coercive power on inter-or-
ganizational trust may vary substantially. At INDIVIDUAL for instance, HUBB exerted its coercive 
power by deciding to replace two software distributors that INDIVIDUAL had been collaborating with 
for many years. This solo-effort was considered to be illegitimate because given its many years of part-
nering with the two distributors INDIVIDUAL had expected to be at least slightly involved in that de-
cision. According to INDIVIDUALBS this negatively influenced inter-organizational trust: 
It certainly is problematic as we constantly built up a trustworthy relationship with those dis-
tributors. In such situations we definitely scrutinize HUBB’s measures. (INDIVIDUALBS) 
In contrast, at AFFILIATE, HUBD exerted coercive power by forcing AFFILIATE to pay a partner fee 
in each market it was partnering with HUBD: 
Yet, we have to pay four times for the very same benefit. (AFFILIATEBS) 
But in contrast to the INDIVIDUAL case, trust was not damaged by the exertion of coercive power, 
since this was seen as legitimate: 
HUBD is not capable to do it differently as it has not a bit of an overview. (AFFILIATEBS) 
Thus, while coercive power may have a negative effect on inter-organizational trust, this negative effect 
seems to exclusively realize if exertion of coercive power is perceived as illegitimate.  
Therefore perceived illegitimacy seems to moderate the negative relationship between exertion of coer-
cive power and inter-organizational trust. 
Pattern 3: The acceptance of higher levels of coercive and reward power are necessary pre-conditions 
for the development of inter-personal trust 
After a complementor has entered a partnership, it is confronted with the so called partner-levels, defined 
by all platform vendors across all analysed ecosystems. Similar to the entry barriers, these partner-levels 
guarantee each complementor certain rewards if the complementor is willing to comply with predefined 
entry requirements that are imposed upon each complementor. Moreover, each complementor has to 
comply with the contractually stipulated right of the platform vendor to punish the complementor, if the 
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complementor is non-compliant with the additional rules and additional entry requirements of the re-
spective partner-level: 
Since several years, we are now, partner on the highest partner level. For this reason we have to 
comply with a certain demanded customer satisfaction, revenue, and, to the best of my 
knowledge, a certified product. (BUSINESSBS) 
We are well aware to be somehow dependent upon HUBB. As we try to get more appreciation 
of HUBB we accept the demanded effort. (INDIVIDUALBS) 
However, it is the acceptance of those additional coercions that lay the ground for the subsequent devel-
opment of inter-personal trust. Because once a complementor has reached the highest partner-level, it 
usually gets assigned to an individual partner manager, acting as a personal and single point of contact 
– before that, inter-personal contacts are highly limited: 
The biggest change in our relationship with HUBB occurred two years after the first participation 
in the ecosystem. At this time we decided to ascend the partner levels to become an attended 
partner. Not till this ascend, the direct interaction with individual boundary spanners was ena-
bled. This definitely eased the communication with HUBB. (ENERGYBS) 
As a consequence of the inter-personal interactions, the complementors reported that inter-personally 
trusted relationships evolved, i.e. trust “builds[t] up over time” (LAYOUTBS) and increased “the more 
you know each other” (INDIVIDUALBS). For COUNTERBS, this was well observable: 
Yet, we initially trusted HUBD as an organization and their products since we did not know the 
employees back then. (COUNTERBS) 
But over the years, and after the raise of partner levels, the formation of inter-personal trust was enabled 
due to the allocated boundary spanners: 
We surely do trust the employees of HUBD by today, since, in our eyes, it’s them that represent 
the organization. (COUNTERBS) 
Interestingly, especially the geographic peculiarities of Switzerland, as a small country, together with 
the dense road and rail networks, seemed to have facilitated this emergence of inter-personally trusted 
relationships: 
This [attendance of complementors] is extremely country-specific. In Germany it was, for in-
stance, largely based on telephone calls or emails, as the distances simply are too big. In Swit-
zerland, however, personal on-site meetings are way easier to realize. (HUBB-BS1) 
And HUBD-H mentioned: 
Due to the small distances in Switzerland, we expect our partner managers to frequently visit 
their attended partners (HUBD-H) 
Taken together, the presented evidence suggests that the acceptance of higher levels of coercive and 
reward power are necessary pre-conditions for the development of inter-personal trust. 
Pattern 4: Exercise of coercive power has no influence on inter-personal trust 
Once a complementor has built up a trusted inter-personal relationship with a partner manager, the ques-
tion arises how the exercise of direct power influences this inter-personal trust. For the case of coercive 
power, this relationship is surprisingly different from the relationship between coercive power and inter-
organizational trust (cp. Pattern 2). While the exercise of coercive power is detrimental for inter-organ-
izational trust, this was not the case for inter-personal trust. In fact, the exercise of coercive power 
seemed to have neither a positive nor a negative influence for inter-personal trust. HUBA-BS2 mentioned 
for instance that whenever HUBA imposed something upon LAYOUT, he does interpret such behavior 
as a sign of lack of inter-personal trustworthiness. The reason for this is that he is aware of his counter-
part is acting as an agent of this platform vendor, i.e., he is not driven through his own motivation. In 
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the case of INDIVIDUAL, trust in HUBB is only limited, while it remains high in its local employees, 
since they follow a slightly different, less aggressive strategy. 
What is more: AFFILIATEBS does not even ascribe responsibility for exercising coercive power to the 
Swiss subsidiary of HUBD because he believes that everything is solely governed by the international 
headquarters of HUBD.  
Hence, as partner managers are perceived to act as agents of a rather impersonal multi-national com-
pany, the inter-personal trust that a complementor places in the partner managers is not affected by 
coercive power. 
Pattern 5: The direction of the relationship between the execution of reward power and inter-personal 
trust is moderated by the perceived legitimacy of the granted rewards 
While coercive power as one type of direct power did not have any effect on inter-personal trust, the 
other type of direct power – i.e. reward power – did have an effect on inter-personal trust.  
After some years of satisfactory collaboration at LAYOUT, HUBA exercised its reward power by grant-
ing LAYOUT with the opportunity to present its company and its products to the European board of 
HUBA. This heavily increased the companies’ visibility inside the multi-national company HUBA. As a 
consequence, LAYOUT was able to acquire new customers in Europe: 
[This] led to the acquisition of our biggest customer - based in the Netherlands. (LAYOUTBS) 
The exertion of reward power was therefore highly appreciated by LAYOUTBS and consequently pro-
moted the development of trust in HUBA’s partner manager: 
I [LAYOUTBS] believe that this enabled visibility heavily fostered our trust in HUBA-BS2, our 
partner manager, as well as in the organization HUBA.  
However, the exercise of reward power does not necessarily have a positive effect on inter-personal 
trust. In fact, it might even have a negative effect if the reward that is granted to the complementor is 
not perceived as legitimate. This can be well illustrated with the case of BUSINESS. After several years 
of partnering with HUBA, BUSINESS decided to develop a new software product that had to be tightly 
integrated with HUBA‘s platform. Therefore, BUSINESS was heavily dependent on HUBA‘s advice: 
At this time we were developing a new product for which we would have been heavily depend-
ent on the support of the partner managers. (BUSINESSBS) 
As a consequence, HUBA used its reward power by giving BUSINESS some information and support. 
Yet, the resulting effect on inter-personal trust was highly detrimental: 
As of today I would consider the cooperation as outstanding, despite my completely opposing 
feelings five years ago. (BUSINESSBS) 
Interestingly, the reason for this detrimental effect was, that reward granted by HUBA was perceived to 
be not as expectable from such a platform vendor and therefore considered as illegitimate: 
The reactions were, however, only insufficient, unofficial, and unsealed data. (BUSINESSBS) 
In a similar vein, AFFILIATEBS was highly disappointed by the sales division of HUBB that offered, in 
his eyes, inadequate marketing and sales support: 
You could imagine sales to be greengrocers whom have not a bit of an idea on how the vegeta-
bles actually grow or look like”.  (AFFILIATEBS) 
This incident ultimately led to enduring distrust between AFFILIATEBS and the respective sales clerks:  
 I would consider this [marketing and sales support] as disastrous. (AFFILIATEBS) 
Taken together, the presented evidence suggests that the effect of exercising reward for inter-personal 
trust can be either negative or positive – depending on whether the rewards granted are considered to 
be legitimate.  
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4.2 Indirect Power and Trust 
While we have observed five different patterns of how different types of direct power interact with 
different types of trust, considerably fewer interactions were observed between indirect power and trust.  
Pattern 6: Indirect power and inter-organizational trust are indirectly connected since they are de-
rived from the same sources 
Indirect power derives from expertise, legitimacy and the identification with the holder of power as a 
reference. Likewise, a trustor is more likely to develop trust if the trustee is perceived to possess distinct 
abilities, willing to not exploit opportunistic behavior (benevolence), and if it allows to develop a mutual 
identification. Thus, trust and indirect power seem to some extent be derived from similar, or even the 
very same sources. At COUNTER for instance, COUNTERBS expressed his willingness to follow HUBD 
due its “strong brand”. But at the same time he considered this power, based on reference, not as threat 
but as one aspect that positively influences his trust in the opposite organization. 
Similarly at ENERGY, as a heavily dependent complementor, relying with every single product on the 
platform of HUBB. ENERGYBS was, however, well aware of HUBB’s expert power since his company 
“heavily relies on major knowhow” about the platform. Yet, this expertise was not only a source of 
power; it also led ENERGYBS to develop confidence and trust towards HUBB and its employees: 
What matters in the end, concerning trust, is relying on the provided knowhow. (ENERGYBS) 
Finally, at LAYOUT, LAYOUTBS was well aware of HUBA‘s prominent role due to its extraordinary 
market share: 
HUBA was, is, and will remain the most important provider of this platform type. (LAYOUTBS) 
Based on this perception he perceived the actions of HUBA as legitimate even if they were at the expense 
of LAYOUT: 
For this reason we accept, for instance, to pay the partner fee, to obtain the required certifica-
tions, or even to conform to the demand of having a certain number of pleased customers. (LAY-
OUTBS) 
Thus, at LAYOUT, the huge market share of the platform vendor, gave HUBA’s, to some extent detri-
mental, actions legitimacy, so that they were not perceived as non-benevolent. 
Taken together, the presented evidence suggests that indirect power and inter-organizational trust are 
indirectly connected because they are derived from the same sources.  
4.3 Summary of Findings 
Our analysis revealed seven patterns of how different types of power interact with different types of 
trust. From a theoretical point of view positive relationships as they are expressed in pattern 1, pattern 
3, pattern 5 (if perceived as legitimate), and pattern 6 can be seen as indicators for complementarity 
(Huber et al., 2011, Huber et al., 2013), while negative relationships as they are expressed in pattern 2 
and pattern 5 (if perceived as illegitimate) can be seen as indicators for substitution (Huber et al., 2011). 
Besides a huge variety of interactions depending on the type of trust and power involved, those interac-
tions also seem to systematically manifest at different points in time because the patterns themselves 
seem to be causally connected in such a way that one pattern may act as a necessary condition for another 
pattern to emerge (e.g. pattern 1  pattern 2; pattern 2  pattern 3  pattern 4) as illustrated for each 
case in Table 4. Thus, power and trust may be both complements and substitutes depending on the point 
of time and the types that are involved in an interaction. 
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Case Sequential order of patterns within each case1 
  
BUSINESS Pattern 12 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 5 Pattern 4  
 Pattern 6      
  
LAYOUT Pattern 1 Pattern 3 Pattern 4 Pattern 5   
 Pattern 6      
  
ENERGY Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 4   
 Pattern 6      
  
INDIVIDUAL Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 4   
 Pattern 6      
  
BANKING Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 5 Pattern 2  
 Pattern 6  Pattern 4    
  
COUNTER Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 2   
 Pattern 6      
  
AFFILIATE Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 2 Pattern 4 Pattern 5 
 Pattern 6      
  
1 Simplification of temporal sequence of pattern occurrence within each case, thus, patterns in the same column 
have not necessarily taken place in parallel. 2 If patterns in a case are vertically stacked then those patterns had 
temporal overlap. 
Table 4: Sequential order of patterns 
5 Discussion 
This study was motivated by the goal to better understand coordination between huge multi-national 
platform vendors and small complementor companies. In doing so we investigated the interplay between 
two coordination mechanisms of paramount importance – trust and power. Our exploratory multiple-
case study of seven partnerships between platform vendors and complementors revealed six different 
patterns of how trust and power interact. Given the absence of empirical studies on the interplay of trust 
and power, the discovery of those interaction patterns provides unique empirical insight and therefore 
has merit in its own right. However, those patterns also bear wider implications for the literature on 
platform ecosystems, the wider literature on trust and power, and managerial practice. 
5.1 Contribution to Literature on Platform ecosystems 
The findings of this study add to recent research on the emergence and the management of platform 
ecosystems (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012, Huang et al., 2013, Kude et al., 2012, Sztompka, 2000). In partic-
ular, previous literature studied the motivation of complementors to participate in platform ecosystems 
as well as the conditions under which these partnerships are successful by referring to the existence of 
higher-level societal institutions such as intellectual property rights that safeguard complementors 
against opportunistic behavior (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012, Huang et al., 2013). Our study, contributes to 
this stream of literature by focusing on two alternative coordination mechanisms that have not been 
studied before in this empirical context and that go beyond legal safeguards – trust and power. As shown 
by our findings, both trust and power are ubiquitous as means to coordinate partnerships in platform 
ecosystems. Since a huge variety of studies has already shown that trust is of major importance for any 
type of inter-organizational relationship, the omnipresence of trust does not come as a surprise in the 
context of platform ecosystems. However, we argued that due to the unique asymmetric dependency of 
this new type of inter-organizational collaboration, power may be a concept of paramount importance 
that has generally received hardly any attention but that is of paramount importance for understanding 
how partnerships in platform ecosystems are coordinated. The omnipresence of power in our study con-
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firms this assumption. Thus, our findings suggest that platform ecosystems are a unique empirical con-
text in which power may make all the difference and that is particularly suited to deepen our understand-
ing of this fundamental principle of coordinating. Our study is a first step towards this direction. 
5.2 Contribution to the wider literature on trust and power 
In recent years a lively and controversial debate on the relationship of trust and power was raised in the 
field of general management and more sociologically oriented literature – with contradictory results 
(Alvarez et al., 2003, Bachmann, 2001, Hart and Saunders, 1997, Ireland and Webb, 2007, Jasperson et 
al., 2002, Lane and Bachmann, 1997, Molm, 1997). To clarify such debates it was recently proposed to 
adopt more fine-grained conceptualizations and to consider the role of time (Huber et al., 2011, Huber 
et al., 2013, Lewis, 2000). Inspired by these arguments we aimed to clarify the trust vs. power debate 
by adopting a more fine-grained conceptualization of both trust and power. In doing so we relied on the 
widely established distinction between inter-personal and inter-organizational trust, as well as on the 
conceptualization of French and Raven who distinguish five different types of power according to the 
source this power is derived from. In addition, we also considered the role of time by explicitly investi-
gating the interplay of trust and power over the course of partnerships between complementors and 
platform vendors. Both strategies to clarify this debate proved successful because we were able to show 
that, first, different types of power and different types of trust interact differently with each other. Thus, 
contradictory results of prior research may be rooted in inconsistent conceptualizations. Second, our 
findings show that trust and power may be complements at one point in time but substitutes at a different 
point in time. Therefore, contradictory results of prior research may be the outcome of different times 
of measurement. Hence, our study provides and empirically substantiates two explanations for why the 
results of prior research may have been contradictory. 
5.3 Contribution to managerial practice 
This paper is based on the information of seven dyadic partnerships within four internationally leading 
EAS platform ecosystems. In doing so we principally highlighted the positions of platform vendors as 
holders of power together with its respective interplay with trust. As with this focus, the results of this 
study mainly represent a valuable source for platform vendors in understanding how the asymmetric 
dependence actually influences the interaction with the respective complementors. In doing so it more-
over enables platform vendors an understanding on how to appropriately apply the provided power for 
effectively governing a respective platform ecosystem. Hence, our study provides practically applicable 
findings about the interaction of trust and power in different points in time that should facilitate the 
governance of platform ecosystems within the EAS industry. 
5.4 Limitations and Future Research 
As a concluding reflection, we point to the main limitations of this study. Our results point out that the 
patterns that occur at systematically different points in time. One possible reason for this occurrence are 
systematic temporal interdependencies amongst our patterns. However, this occurrence could also be 
triggered by external events. Future research should therefore further examine the reasons for this tem-
poral interdependencies. A second limitation is presented by the fact, that all the investigated partner-
ships were located in Switzerland. Our results suggest that the distinct geographic conditions, with the 
short distances may have simplified the development of inter-personally trusted relationships. Thus, it 
would be favorable for future research to additionally investigate partnerships in larger countries to 
clarify the role of geographic proximity for the interplay of trust and power. Third, the results of our 
study are based on a limited number of cases, and moreover interviewee selection was based on snowball 
sampling where the platform boundary spanners were asked to select partner organizations. Hence, it 
might be that the selected case studies are not representative for the population of partnerships. There-
fore, future research should not only try to study more cases but also make sure that the cases are repre-
sentative for the population. Fourth, this study mostly relied on retrospective interviews. While this 
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reduced the risk of data overload, and while we took triangulation measures to ascertain the validity of 
our findings, respondents might still have had the opportunity to conceal valuable information. This 
might be particularly true for indirect power: While power-holders might disguise the exertion of power 
in general, the one who is subject to this power usually feels when direct power is exerted. Thus, trian-
gulation works well for direct power. However, the influence of indirect power is more subtle such that 
the one who is subject to the exertion of indirect power might not even realize it. Hence, the limited 
number of interactions that involve indirect power might be a consequence of the data sources that we 
relied on. Thus, future studies should build on the results of our studies but rely on additional data 
sources such as observations to add further credence to the novel interaction patterns that we have un-
veiled through our empirical investigation.  
Appendix 
List of Case Specific Abbreviations 
COMPANYBS Boundary spanner of COMPANY 
HUBX-BSY Boundary spanner Y of HUB X 
HUBX-H Head of Partner management at HUB X 
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